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INTRODUCTION
One of the most familiar concepts to historians
interested in Anglo-American topics is that of the Atlantic
Economy.
Political independence did not bring economic
independence to the newly-found United States, and until
after the middle of the nineteenth century trans-Atlantic
trade continued much as it was in the colonial period,
based on the exchange of primary produce for manufactured
goods.
Basic statistics confirm that Britain and the
United States were each the major trading partner of the
other in the first half of the nineteenth century. In this
period, between a third and a half of all U.S. imports were
drawn from Britain (Table 3), while Britain depended on the
U.S. to feed its most important industry, rising American
imports of raw cotton topping 80 per cent of total input at
mid-century (Table 2). Given Britain's global dominance of
cotton manufacturing at the period, it is not surprising
that the U.S. was by no means the only destination of
exports, but exporting obviously began there (with 97 per
cent of the market in the mid 1780s) and even at midcentury was more than a third by value (Table 1).
TABLE 1: U.K. Export of Cotton Goods to the U.S.A.
1784 - 1856 (£OOOs)

1784-6
1794-6
1804-6
1814-16
1824-6
1834-6
1844-6
1854-6

total

U.S.A.

U.S. %

292
2432
7964
7010
6490
7730
6326
10814

213
1540
4550
2405
1883
2296
1077
3809

97.3
63.3
57.1
34.3
29.0
29.7
17.0
35.2

Source: R. Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British
Overseas Trade (Leicester, 1979), p.19.
These figures do not simply confirm the concept of the
Atlantic Economy, they serve as a reminder that cotton
occupied the key role in that complimentary relationship.
At the local level, data on the trans-Atlantic connection
serves to further emphasise its importance; for instance
Sir Francis Baring, the leading London merchant of his day,
estimated in 1812 that between a quarter and a third of
Manchester's trade went to the U.S., and in the satellite
manufacturing town of Bury (where the Peels of calico
printing fame dominated) it was as high as a half. The
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great port of Liverpool, as is well known, was built on the
trans-Atlantic cotton trade.
However, such statistics
provide only the profile of the subject.
Proper
understanding requires a study of the organisation and
personal connections behind the data. Some research has
been done on basic organisation, but the identity and
trans-Atlantic connections of the leading entrepreneurs is
a surprisingly neglected subject.
TABLE 2: U.K. Import of U.S. Raw Cotton - American Share of
the Market (per cent), 1786-1880
1786-90
1796-1800
1806-10
1816-20
1826-30
Source:

79.9%
81.1
77.0
43.2
71.1

1836r40
1846-50
1856-60
1866-70
1876-80

0.2%
24.1
53.1
47.3
74.5

T. Ellison, The Cotton Trade of G.B. (1886), p.86.

TABLE 3: U.S. Imports from the U.K. ($m), 1821-50
imports
1821-5
1826-30
1831-5
1836-40
1841-5
1846-50

$151. 3m
138.7
220.0
254.4
178.3
285.7

% of
total

exports

40.4
38.8
40.9
38.7
37.4
40.6

$122. 2m
117.6
188.3
273.8
221.1
349.5

% of
total
35.5
33.6
41.0
47.5
43.7
50.7

Source: N.S. Buck, The development of the Organisation of
Anglo-American Trade 1800-1850 (Yale, 1925), p.2.
The main thesis of this paper is that, like the two
economies, the personnel of the trans-Atlantic cotton trade
can readily be identified in close and complimentary
relationships. However the relationship was by no means an
unchanging one; Britain's industrial revolution was the
central feature of the period, and this necessarily
involved changes in leadership and trading organisation
that had repercussions through the emerging international
economy. To simplify, the subject can be considered in
three overlapping phases, (1) the eighteenth century
merchant community, which spanned the Atlantic, (2) the
basic nineteenth century structure of commission agents
(merchants) financed by merchant banks, and (3) the slow
rise of manufacturer-merchants.
We can examine each of
these in turn.
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MERCHANT COMMUNITY
The most obvious features of the eighteenth century
merchant were that he was an entrepreneur who traded with

his own capital on his own account, and that he was a
?h*nr* £**?r, -irl a Particular geographical sector rather
than a specialist in one or two commodities. Young men
r^n I--* g°0<l education' considerable capital and sound
connections to embark on a mercantile career, and
bankruptcy was high, so that merchants came to constitute
an elite in pre-industrial society.
in specific terms
when Mortimer's Uniyerj|aiJ)irector_ (1763) appeared, there
S?a?es I litS"1**1 me~hantS fading to the^uture United
' lXttl? .m°rethan ten *>er cent of th* total number
O1?^iS.'
Of these '18 **& interests in New
and 27 in the plantation states of Virginia
Maryland and Carolina. A generation later, at the enS of
a wel,1-connected American merchant counted ten
houses' and six 'American Shippers' ( i e
merchants and shippers trading with the U.S.) in Liverpool"
On the eve of the American Revolution there were onlv 20
Phn !rt8 ig£ - ficantly inv°lv*d with the main colonial port of
Philadelphia, mostly from London but a few based in
Liverpool, Manchester and other provincial centres
These numbers illustrate just how small the eighteenth
yr ±£?c<™ity was«
Given the highly lociaSe
.
eighteenth century middle class society, it was
perfectly possible for every merchant to know every other
"^

Chapel

the

there
eiah?eenth
tofcrldit
their

merchant

to

an

international
simUar
and from
Step ^° the 9ranting of credit. The
!°er=antile structure was sustained by
merchants granted to their suppliers and to
ln the
^ef^an market this credit
and s°»*ti»es enforced
includi"9 commercial ethics,

°f the eighteenth century, the most lucrative
**? Cot?:on manufacture and trade was in printed
i ^St Jndia C°- Came to dominate the
enre«ot fo
L°nd°n beCame the ^reat international
entrepot for the sale of these prized fabrics whilo the.

Edd°WeS &Petrie' their trade developed
frOB Holland for printing, and from
tUrned t0 home-made
fustians and prints

4.linenS
the
th

h°^°n g°°dS W6re P"minent in the tradef in
Manchester merchants R. & N. Hyde were exoortina
^
tht°
ther ^T g°°dS direct to the ^erica^
and they
were
shortly followed by N. & F. Philips
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with smallwares (tapes etc.).
The number of merchants on both sides of the Atlantic
increased after the Revolution, but kinship and chapel
connections were still important.
Joshua Gilpin, the
Philadelphia Quaker merchant who toured England in the
1790s, recorded numbers of these connections.
Thus in
Manchester he noted that Samuel Greg & Co. (successors to
R. & N. Hyde) were 'connected with J. Lyle of Philadelphia'
and John Pares, the leading Leicester merchant hosier was
connected with the same American house. The most striking
change in the last quarter of the century was, however, the
growth of independent provincial merchants; thus in
Nottingham (one of the most inland of all English manufacturing towns) Gilpin wrote 'A large trade is carried on
from Nottingham direct to America by the manufacturers
[i.e. merchant organisers of domestic industry] ... Mark
Huish is the most established merchant in Nottingham to
America... he supplies most of the good houses in
Philadelphia with hosiery on 12 mos. credit, sends both
silk, cotton and worsted—'
Indeed, so keen was the
competition from the rising industrial centres that one
Philadelphia importer snorted that 'Credit is as cheap this
year as it was in 1784 - The Manchester folks have made all
the
reta i1
Shopkeepers
and
merchants
apprentices
Importers!'
COMMISSION AGENTS AND MERCHANT BANKS
In the closing years of the French Wars difficult
trading conditions led to the bankruptcy or retirement of
many of the old merchants of London, Liverpool, and
Bristol, and the simultaneous withdrawal of a large number
of manufacturers who had ventured into overseas marketing.
In their place there emerged a new generation of
specialists, commission
agents
resident
in foreign
commercial centres (but usually having a partner or agent
in Britain), and a handful of wealthy merchants who had
graduated to pure finance and provided the credits for
manufacturers to send their goods to agents abroad. These
merchants later became known as merchant banks or
'accepting houses' as much of their business came from
'accepting' (or endorsing) the bills of exchange signed by
the less credit-worthy enterprises who were their clients.
The commission agents were characteristically young men of
modest capital who went to seek their fortunes abroad. At
the end of the French Wars most of those selling British
goods appear to have been British born, but during the next
twenty years, and particularly after 1825, the European and
North American markets were increasingly served by the
junior partners of United states, German, Greek, and other
foreign merchant houses who came to British industrial
towns to select goods. Meanwhile British commission agents
moved out into the less developed but more distant markets,
particularly Latin America and the Orient, no doubt hoping
for less competition and more profit.
In 1834 Lord
Liverpool (British Prime Minister from 1812 to 1827)
believed that two-thirds of the entire trade of Britain was
conducted by commission merchants, and it was particularly

important in the export business of Lancashire and
Yorkshire. At the same period, the Circular to Bankers
estimated that the merchant bankers were providing as much
as 80 per cent of the finance required for exporting to
Britain's biggest customer, the United States.
This
influential periodical maintained that these bankers had
brought greater stability to the trans-Atlantic trade by
their discretion in regulating the traffic in bills of
exchange. Major American and German merchant houses bought
directly from the warehouses of British manufacturers in
London or Manchester, very often financed by London
merchant banks; indeed the whole system became an
international enterprise.
The manufacturers benefitted
because they were less exposed to the risk of selling in
overseas markets. From the late 1820s the new mercantile
leadership was gradually concentrated in fewer hands.
This is appropriately illustrated from the experience
of Liverpool. The shipping bills of entry show that in the
first half of the century cotton importing was increasingly
concentrated into the hands of a small group of 30 or so
operators who generally undertook a much narrower range of
functions than the 'generalists' of the eighteenth century
had done. They tended to specialise in the import of the
one commodity (cotton), and in the export of cotton yarns
and piece goods.
The letters of the Bank of England's
Agent (manager) in Liverpool offer more striking commentary
on the firms in this concentration.
In 1829 the five
biggest merchant houses imported 18 per cent of total
British imports of cotton; in 1842-3 the leading six
importers took 27 pr cent of total imports. The leading
importer in the late 1820s was W. & J. Brown & Co., a firm
of Irish-American origin with bases in Philadelphia and New
York. They were followed by Alston, Finlay & Co., who were
a branch of an old-established Glasgow house (James Finlay
& Co.), and then by Cropper, Benson & Co., an English
Quaker firm with close family ties with the American Quaker
cousinhood already referred to.
These diverse origins
reflected those in the port at large; among 29 leading
firms identified by the Bank at the end of the 1820s, at
least six were of U.S. origin and three were Scottish. At
the end of the 1820s some leading London merchants 1 ike
Barings, Schroders, Kleinworts and Huths opened important
branches in Liverpool, and in the 1830s they were joined by
a number of smaller firms that were off-shoots of
Continental financiers.
Developments in commercial organisation in the 1830s
increased the financial demands on merchant houses. In the
most rapid period of industrialisation of the textile
districts of the north of England (1780-1815), many
manufacturers integrated forward into merchanting, partly
because the profits in this pioneer period offered a strong
incentive, but more particularly because the existing
mercantile community did not have the knowledge and
capacity to cope with new (or improved) products and
rapidly extending markets. At the same period, a number of
merchants in various manufacturing centres integrated
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backwards into manufacturing, seeking the high profits
enjoyed in these years. But after the French Wars, and
more particularly after the boom of 1825 subsided
increasing competition among manufacturers steadily reduced
the interest of the group as a whole in overseas trade and
finance. The development was more fully explained by Henry
Menzies, partner in Gisborne, Menzies & Co., Cropper
Benson's Bombay operation, in 1835:
The small percentage to which competition has
reduced profits in Manchester and Yorkshire has
given such an advantage to the merchant over the
manufacturer in shipping abroad that the foreign
export trade of this country is returning more and
more every year to the 'purchase system'.
A
[merchant] buyer can ensure a good and comprehensive
assortment. He ships at the best seasons, watching
the terms of prices at home, and the quantities of
goods going forward to the place of consumption,
while with a few exceptions the manufacturer's plan
is to sell where he can and ship only his surplus...
In other words, the eighteenth century overseas
merchant who, in the course of industrial expansion, had
become a commission merchant, was now reverting to his
earlier more independent role. But in the forty or fifty
years that separated these two changes, British overseas
trade had increased dramatically in volume and moved
towards more distant markets, so that it was no longer
possible to conduct and finance a diversified overseas
trade on a small capital.
TABLE 4:
Importing

Concentration
1820

of Mercantile Leadership:
1826-7

1830

1832

Cotton

1839

% of cotton
imported by

Top 3 importers

9

23

13

15

17

Top 6 importers

16

32

23

24

28

Top 10 importers

24

39

35

32

38

Source: Extracted from J.R. Killick, 'The Cotton Operations
of Alexander Brown & Sons in the Deep South 1820-1860 ,
.Tnl . of Southern History XLIII (1977) Table 1.
The big merchants tended to increase their lead during
this period because during the recurrent trade crises they
were generally more cautious and consequently emerged
largely unscathed while more bold but less prudent concerns
were ruined. The tendency is nicely illustrated in data
collected by John Killick (Table 4) from which it can be
seen that the leading firms in the cotton trade increased
their share of an increasing market in the periods

following the crises of 1825 and 1836-7, slipping back a
little in the periods of crowded enterprise between.
MERCHANT-MANUFACTURERS AND MANUFACTURER-MERCHANTS
Some reference has already been made to Lancashire
manufacturers extending their operations into merchanting
in the early period of mechanisation. In the 1790s as many
as 60 firms were recorded operating in the two activities,
and a few focussed on one export market; thus Heywood &
Palfreyman of Wildboarclough (Macclesfield) cotton mill and
printworks supplied the American market direct.
TransAtlantic marketing initiatives probably began with Peel &
Yates, the leading Lancashire calico printers; according to
a tradition long held at the firm's Bury works, it was
their chintzes that the American colonists prohibited their
wives and daughters from wearing at the Revolution. After
the Napoleonic War, Fielden Bros, of Todmorden became the
most successful firm of mill spinners and weavers in
England; nearly all their output was exported and in their
early years much of it went to America. However such big
firms cannot be counted as representative, at any rate
after the post-war depression had forced nearly all
manufacturers back to their traditional specialism. It was
not until the age of the telegraph, when direct and instant
communication between producer and trans-Atlantic wholesaler or retailer became possible, that the merchant began
to fear redundancy. However it took the remainder of the
century for the full implications of improved communications to be translated into new organisation.
The first barrier was the exporter's need to
understand
the market in which his customers
were
operating, but where he was selling standard commodities to
North America or the 'white colonies' there was not too
much problem about this, particularly in the 1860s and
1870s when competition was less severe than it became
later.
Indeed, the most successful entrepreneur in the
trans-Atlantic trade in the middle decades of the century,
a Scottish American called Alexander Turney Stewart, built
up an organisation that linked factories and an export
warehouse
in Britain with
a vast
U.S.
importing
organisation, retail emporium in New York and a mail order
business. Sharp, Stewart & Co. employed over 2,000 in the
Manchester warehouse alone, and there was also a cotton
mill in the area, a linen factory in Belfast, and a hosiery
and lace factory in Nottingham.
The buying organisation
had offices in every important textile and clothing centre
in Britain and on the continent, and agents as far away as
India.
In 1864 it was reported that the wholesale and
retail organisation in Broadway was 'probably the most
extensive and perfect in the U.S., every article accepted
to the D.G. [dry goods] trade may be found here', and
within the decade 2,200 people were employed there with
others in New York clothing factories.
Capital rose
rapidly from $10.Om (£2.Om) to $50.Om (£10.Om) in the
decade 1862-71, far outpacing anything previously seen on
either side of the Atlantic.
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Stewart can fairly be regarded as the pioneer of
vertically integrated and international trading organisations that have dominated the twentieth century
marketing scene, but in the nineteenth century his vast
organisation had few authentic successors and it declined
rapidly after his demise. The failure to follow his lead
probably had more to do with the preconceptions of
entrepreneurs in Britain and America than any physical
restraints.
In Britain vertical combines and transAtlantic combines were long inhibited by the highly
fragmented structure of the textile industries. In America
the entrepreneurs who made great fortunes in dry goods at
this period (for instance John & James Stuart & Co., J.
Seligraan & Co. and Geo. Bliss & Co.) evidently preferred to
shift to pure finance, where more money might be made with
less effort.
If it was not possible to dispense with the merchant
entirely, certainly the chains of middlemen characteristic
of earlier generations of mercantile enterprise were no
longer necessary. Taking the best-known case to illustrate
the point, the movement of raw cotton from America to
Europe, the chain included merchants or agents in the
southern ports (Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans etc.),
shippers, merchants at the British ports, cotton brokers in
Liverpool, cotton dealers in Manchester, Blackburn and
other centres, and buying brokers who represented the
spinning mills.
In buying as in selling, large transAtlantic trading and manufacturing organisations emerged in
the 1860s and 1870s on the foundations of family businesses
established in earlier years. The best known was De Jersey
& Co. of Manchester, who were the British arm of Ludwig
Knoop & Co., a German merchant with extensive mill
interests in Russia.
In 1875 it was thought to be the
largest cotton buyers in the world with branches in all the
cotton markets in Europe and America. Julius Knoop began
his New York career as a pedlar and sent his son for
apprenticeship with De Jerseys.
By 1882 the firm was
thought to be worth over a £l,0m, outclassing anything
previously seen in the raw cotton importing trade.
The characteristic reluctance of Lancashire manufacturers to export can be illustrated from the case
history of a major firm. In the 1880s Tootal Broadhurst
Lee were Lancashire's third biggest firm after Rylands and
Horrockses.
Following incorporation in 1888 the firm
reviewed its overseas marketing organisation, which had
hitherto consisted of appointing exclusive agents round the
world, paying them 10 or 15 per cent commission on sales.
It was reported from New York that in the years 1881-7
direct sales to a dozen retailers had risen from under 10
per cent to 63 per cent, with a corresponding fall in sale
through merchants, jobbers and wholesalers.
American
producers were supplying more and more of the home market
but there was scope for more sales in better and finer
goods.
Consequently it was decided to open a New York
office, which was soon paying its way.
However the
decision to make this change was only reached because it

was argued that 'our present trade with the importers and
jobbers has now fallen to such a figure... that we run
little risk of losing anything by the proposed change', and
the system of agents was retained in other markets,
including the Continent, Latin America, and the Far East.
Rylands and Horockses also continued to rely on commission
agents in Manchester (usually known as 'Shipping houses')
and in overseas trading centres; to what extent these
houses also traded on their own account is still not clear.
The explanation for this widespread reluctance can be
found in the experience of several leading manufacturermerchants earlier in the century. Fielden Bros.provide a
striking illustration because in the middle decades of the
century they had the largest capital of any Lancashire
cotton manufacturer; in specific terms partnership capital
rose from £227,000 in 1831 to £683,000 at the death of John
Fielden (1849) and then to over £1.0m ($5.Om) at the period
of the American Civil War (1862-5). The brothers advanced
into merchanting in the 1830s from having a huge output of
cheap fabrics from their eleven spinning mills and two
power loom plants and 'a large surplus capital'.
They
became partners in the firm of Wildes, Pickersgill & Co. of
Liverpool, London and New York, one of the so-called '3Ws'
that was forced to suspend payments in the commercial
crisis that paralysed American trade from 1837 to 1839.
The Fieldens suffered a long period of anxiety and severe
losses in 1841-2 from which they were only saved by a Bank
of England loan that had to be secured by their railway and
other investments. Other producers were less fortunate.
Butterworth, Brooks & Co., who were probably the largest
producers of popular prints in the early nineteenth
century, lost more than half their capital between 1834 and
1846 and retired from trade. Robert Gardner was probably
the most successful of Manchester's self-made men after
Fieldens and Butterworth of Brooks; by 1835 he was
employing 4,500 handloom weavers in the Preston area and
was a major exporter to the U.S.A., Brazil and other
overseas markets.
He was forced into bankruptcy in the
crisis of 1847 even though his debts, mostly for bills
payable, were only a little over £100,000 while his assets
were valued at £350,000. The.explanation was £200,000 of
'illiquid' export stock lying in warehouses round the
Americas. These bitter experiences became the folk-lore of
the Lancashire industry, inhibiting change to the structure
of the industry for more than two generations. So it was
that merchants and financiers continued to be the most
significant figures in the cotton sector of the Atlantic
Economy for the whole of the nineteenth century.
CONCLUSION
My conclusion must be confined to the implications of
this paper for American researchers, and particularly those
working in museums and with artefacts. The archives of the
East Coast historical societies bear witness to the
enormous trans-Atlantic trade in printed cottons and it
would be good to connect some of this material with
surviving fabrics and pattern books. However it must be
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borne in mind that few merchants were also calico printers,
and more work needs to be done to establish the connections
between the two. Similarly, in the nineteenth century,
most of the extant corespondence in United States sources
must be with 'Shipping houses' and commission agents;
direct connections between American importers and British
manufacturers were the exception. However any such records
must be of unusual interest.
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THE AMERICAN MARKET FOR INDIAN TEXTILES, 1785-1820:
IN THE TWILIGHT OF TRADITIONAL CLOTH MANUFACTURE
Susan S. Bean
Peabody Museum of Salem
A brisk trade in Indian cloth developed soon after the end of the American
War of Independence in 1783 and continued to flourish until Congress enacted
a prohibitive tariff in 1816 to protect the nascent U.S. textile manufacturing
industry. For the period 1795-1805, U.S. trade with India well exceeded trade
with all European nations combined for all commodities (Furber 1938:258).
Cloth was the centerpiece of this trade: The piece goods imported in 1804-05,
for instance, were about three times the value of all other goods from India,
chiefly sugar, indigo, ginger, and a variety of spices and drugs (Bhagat
1970:42). Ironically, this trade was doomed before it began by the rapid
growth and spread of the industrial revolution. After centuries of supplying
the world with cotton textiles (and to a lesser extent, silk textiles), India was
soon to become an importer of cloth manufactured in the West,
The purposes of this paper are to establish that there was a distinct
American market for Indian textiles, to identify the varieties of cloth exported
for the American market, and to sketch American resources for further study.

THE AMERICAN MARKET
For the heyday of the U.S.-India trade, from 1785 to about 1820, there is a
tremendous amount of documentary evidence. But because the trade was
carried on by a large number of independent businessmen rather than a single
trading company, as was the practice in Europe, these materials lie scattered
in private collections, historical societies, archives and museums. From these
sources the development of a distinct American market for textiles can be
discerned.
As early as the 1790s, there were Indian merchants specializing in the
American trade. In 1806 Nasserwanjee Manackjee Wadia in Bombay, for
example, was known as an agent for the American and French trades (George
Nichols nd:34). In Calcutta, where Americans did most of their business, Ram
Dulal Dey became such a valued expert that in 1801 more than thirty of his
American clients presented him with a life-size portrait of George Washington.
A comment in the 1803-04 journal of Dudley Pickman, a prominent Salem
merchant, indicates that the American market may even have had two
segments. In describing the Calcutta firm of Durgapersaud and Kallisunker
Ghose, he wrote that they "do some Southern (U.S.) business and more
Northern business..." (Peabody Museum of Salem: Pickman Journal). Boston
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